11 Worst Generals Of World War II

By 1939, warfare had experienced dramatic and exponential changes since the end of the First World War. Gone were the days of stationary enemy lines; thanks to technological advancements, World War II ushered in a rapid form of mobile combat never before seen. And grappling with this new-fangled warfare was a generation of military leaders that didn't always get it right.

Indeed, World War II was a completely different mammoth than its predecessor. The global and catastrophic conflict required new and bolder strategies. The rise of tanks and superior aircraft meant armies could cover far greater distances in record time. This meant innovative leadership was needed; generals would need to maintain extended supply lines while committing to swift offensive movements. World War II saw commanders like Dwight D. Eisenhower masterfully balance these categories. However, not all generals could handle this new era of war. Some, while performing well in certain phases of the historic conflict, faltered significantly when pulled out of their element. Others, well, probably should not have been given a position of high command in the first place.

Field Marshal Erwin Rommel and his Afrika Korps are frequently lauded to a near-mythical degree for their military prowess, particularly in North Africa. While Rommel's victories, which earned him the moniker of "the Desert Fox," certainly stunned and shocked his Allied foes, historians like Larry H. Addington (via Military Affairs) concluded after the war that even Rommel's greatest achievements in North Africa didn't amount to much in the grand scheme of Axis strategy. In fact, Addington alluded to Rommel's initial North African triumphs as a marvelous success only in the superficial sense. Even at the height of Rommel's success in North Africa, he and his forces were never in the most optimal position, often reliant on captured British supplies and vehicles. Overall, Rommel never showed a true appreciation for the science of logistics.

In his book, "Field Marshal: The Life and Death of Erwin Rommel," Daniel Allen Butler writes that, during his early career fighting in Belgium and France: "Rommel was also too prone to leave his staff and sometimes even his radio vehicle behind while personally directing the actions of a single company or battalion, making effective coordination of the division's armor, infantry, and artillery problematic at best." 

A commander of Rommel's caliber should have recognized that communication, or lack thereof, can spell doom for any operation. Even Butler, who frequently defends the German commander against accusations targeting his alleged logistical shortcomings, admits that Rommel could needlessly impede his own momentum by keeping his staff in the dark.

Lieutenant General Renya Mutaguchi deserves much more attention from military historians and general World War II buffs, not for his elite-level command but for how incredibly reckless his tactics were.

After securing victory against the British in Singapore in 1942, the Japanese commander Mutaguchi wished to continue his success, this time in India. He believed that if the British could be overcome in Assam — northeastern India — the rest of the subcontinent would soon follow, and even look at his forces as a sort of liberation force from British rule. While Mutaguchi certainly knew how to dream big, he was terrible at planning small. When on the offensive against British opposition in Imphal, he had thousands of his men march great distances while only carrying 20 days' worth of provisions. Mutaguchi believed that if they trekked light, lived off the land, and stole British supplies, speed would be their ultimate ally against the enemy. The Japanese commander also assumed British opposition would immediately crumble at the first sign of pressure and ignored their formidable aircraft capabilities.

These drastic miscalculations proved dire for Japanese forces, who had to contend with invisible foes like starvation and exhaustion before even encountering the enemy. According to Louis Allen's "Burma: The Longest War," in the aftermath of the conflict, Japanese casualties far outweighed those of the British, with the former suffering 54,879 and the latter 12,603. Ultimately, Mutaguchi's leadership proved just as deadly to his men as British bullets. In December 1944, the lieutenant general was called back to Tokyo, relieved of his command, and forced into retirement.

Grigory Ivanovich Kulik's gross arrogance and incompetence were given a historic spotlight when he attempted to lead the initial stages of the Leningrad Front in 1941. Historians agree that his inept command gave way to dire setbacks and serious defeats, and he was swiftly relieved of his command.

Kulik, marshal of the Soviet Union, appears to have been a commander more interested in currying favor with Joseph Stalin than focusing on pragmatic military command and technological innovation. Post-war historians have frequently noted that Kulik spent an absurd amount of energy and time opposing certain mechanized advancements. John Keegan, author of "The Second World War," wrote of the Soviet commander: "[He was a] technological reactionary who opposed the distribution of automatic weapons to soldiers on the grounds that they were incapable of handling them and halted the production of anti-tank and anti-craft guns."

In a period when the Soviet Union would need every advantage they could muster against Nazi Germany, Kulik's actions were detrimental to the Soviet cause. By multiple accounts, he consistently acted as an obstacle against certain technological advancements regarding tanks throughout his military tenure. This is laced with tragic irony, as Soviet armor such as the T-34 proved to be more than capable of giving invading German forces a hellacious time.

[Featured image by Mil.ru via Wikimedia Commons | Cropped and scaled | CC BY-SA 4.0]

The Battle of Okinawa is frequently cited as World War II's bloodiest Pacific engagement, as the Allied victory over the small island led to over 75,000 American casualties. One of the leading commanders who fiercely opposed the Allied landings was Lieutenant General Isamu Chō, a hardline nationalist whose offensive tactics at Okinawa failed drastically.

American forces attacked Okinawa on April 1, 1945. Chō organized the island's defense alongside Colonel Yahara Hiromichi, with the latter preferring a defensive-oriented strategy. However, Chō thought otherwise. Believing the American offensive was vulnerable, the lieutenant general launched a massive attack on May 4 against the American troops against Yahara's warnings. According to Richard Fuller's book, "Shokan: Hirohito's Samurai": "[The offensive was a] complete failure with very losses." By the next day, Chō and his forces were retreating to a different part of the island, but the writing was on the wall. On June 19, knowing the American victory was a certainty, the lieutenant general died by ritual suicide. 

What makes Chō's actions so peculiar is that, upon first arriving in Okinawa in 1944, he and Yahara worked together in setting up fortifications and tunnels that could be relied on in a sort of attrition-type strategy. However, just a little over a month after the battle began, Chō completely shifted gears by sending the majority of his forces in a disastrous charge. In hindsight, this makes sense, as one of the first words Fuller uses to describe the commander's personality is "short-tempered" (via "Shokan: Hirohito's Samurai"). Short-tempered indeed.

In May of 1940, France was not in the greatest position. The German Blitzkrieg had launched its tanks and heavy armor through the Ardennes Forest and were closing in on Paris. To shore up the defenses of a quickly deteriorating situation, the French government brought in World War I veteran and military commander Maxime Weygand. Unfortunately for the Allies, this turned out to be oil on an already raging inferno.

As if the situation in France wasn't bad enough, with Hitler's forces rapidly nearing the capital, Weygand managed to find ways to make everything worse. On the morning of May 19, the French command ordered troops fighting in Belgium to come down to meet the attacking Germans. That evening, Weygand was given command, and one of the first things he did was to cancel that counterattack. After conferring with other Allied commanders for three days, Weygand committed to the same exact plan that was made before. This gave German infantry a tremendous opportunity to catch up with its rapidly moving heavy armor and close any gaps in its offensive.

Paris fell on June 14, 1940 and an official armistice was signed with Germany on June 22. In July 1939, Weygand had declared, "The French army is stronger than ever before in its history; its equipment is the best, its fortifications are first-rate; its morale excellent, and it has an outstanding High Command. Nobody wants war but if we are forced to win a new victory then we will win it" (per "Blitzkrieg: Myth, Reality, and Hitler's Lightning War: France 1940").